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Uber, Lyft, DoorDash and similar mobile-based transportation network
companies (TNCs) have been involved in numerous legal battles in multiple
jurisdictions. One contested issue concerns whether TNC drivers are
employees or independent contractors. Uber recently lost this battle to some
extent in the UK,1 but won it in California.2 Another issue concerns the
TNCs’ use of mandatory (pre-dispute) arbitration clauses in their standard
form service agreements with both drivers and passengers. These arbitration
clauses purport to obligate such future plaintiffs to resolve any dispute with
the defendant TNC outside of court and, typically, on an individual rather
than a class basis. TNCs have had mixed success enforcing arbitration
clauses contained in service agreements with their drivers under the Federal
† Assistant Professor, University of Alberta Faculty of Law.
1. Uber BV and others v. Aslam and others, [2021] UKSC 5. The UK Supreme

Court decided that Uber drivers are “workers” under English employment law, rather
than self-employed independent contractors. The Court stopped short of finding the
drivers are “employees”, which would have afforded them more rights. In Canada, the
Supreme Court has recently struck down the arbitration clause in Uber’s service
agreement with the plaintiff driver, who claimed to be an employee rather than an
independent contractor. While the Court did not determine the employment issue, it
found the arbitration clause to be unconscionable, leaving Uber to argue the merits of the
dispute in the courts rather than in arbitration. Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020]
S.C.R. 16 (Can.).
2. Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Drivers in California Will Remain Contractors,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/technology/california
-uber-lyft-prop-22.html.
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Arbitration Act (FAA).3 As for passengers, TNCs have been increasingly
litigating disability-based discrimination claims brought against them and/or
their drivers pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).4 These
claims have largely arisen in two situations.
The first situation is where the plaintiffs have not downloaded or used the
defendant TNC’s mobile application due to the absence of accessible
vehicles. These “potential passengers” have brought discrimination claims
against the defendant TNC in court for its failure to provide accessible
vehicles that they could use. TNCs in such cases have raised two main lines
of arguments: an ADA-based argument and an arbitration-based argument.
The TNCs’ ADA-based argument posits that the plaintiffs do not have
standing to bring the discrimination claims under the ADA since they had
not in fact used the TNC’s mobile application and therefore have not suffered
the required “injury” to have standing under the Act. Where the plaintiff
potential passengers have been found to have such standing nonetheless, the
TNCs have put forward an alternative arbitration-based argument––that the
plaintiffs should be bound by the arbitration clause contained in the service
agreement, which they did not sign, and that their claims should therefore be
referred to arbitration. As the district court for the District of Columbia has
noted, accepting this argument would create “a Catch-22: to establish . . .
standing to sue [a TNC] for an ADA violation, plaintiffs must download the
Uber app, but by doing so, they sign away their right to litigate their claims
in court.”5
The second situation in which disability-based discrimination claims
under the ADA have been brought against TNCs is where the plaintiffs
downloaded the mobile application, agreed to the terms of service, and used
the ride-share services. These plaintiff passengers are then typically
obligated to argue their discrimination claims in arbitration in light of the
arbitration clause contained in the TNCs service agreement.6 Indeed, TNCs
seem to prefer arbitration to litigation in court, a preference that some have
3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. Some federal courts have granted the TNCs’ motions to
compel arbitration of drivers’ claims, while other courts have refused to do so. Compare
Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919, 934 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (granting Uber’s
motion to compel arbitration), with Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 37, 48 (D.
Mass. 2020) (denying Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings pending
arbitration).
4. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
5. Equal Rights Center v. Uber Tech., Inc., 2021 WL 981011, *20 n.7 (D.D.C.
2021).
6. In some cases, courts have refused to compel such plaintiff passengers to
arbitrate, for instance where the TNC’s terms of service “were not conspicuous enough
reasonably to communicate the existence or terms of the agreement,” including the
arbitration clause. Theodore v. Uber Tech., Inc., 442 F. Supp. 3d 433, 442 (D. Mass.
2020).
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criticized as a strategy designed to prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their
legal rights. However, a recent arbitration decision rendered against Uber in
an ADA discrimination case (Irving v. Uber),7 discussed below, illustrates
that arbitration is able to provide the same legal protection to plaintiffs’ rights
as a court. Therefore, while there are many good reasons for TNCs to prefer
arbitration over litigation, such as speed and arbitrator’s expertise,8 Irving v.
Uber demonstrates that a guaranteed win on the merits is not one of them.
In this Essay, I examine the two situations described above in which
arbitration issues intersect with discrimination claims made pursuant to the
ADA in the TNC-passenger context. In so doing, I do not purport to analyze
the merits of the plaintiff passengers’ ADA claims, but rather focus on the
arbitration aspects of these claims. In Part I, I discuss recent ADA cases
brought by potential passengers (those who have not downloaded or used the
TNC’s services) before the courts, with partial success.9 I explain the
defendant TNCs’ standing argument under the ADA and their alternative
arbitration-based argument. In Part II, I turn to ADA cases involving plaintiff
passengers. I discuss the Irving v. Uber arbitration and suggest that this case
provides a rebuttal, albeit anecdotal, to some of the common criticisms of
mandatory arbitration in the consumer context. In Part III, I offer brief
conclusions.
I.

ARBITRATION ISSUES IN ADA CASES AGAINST TNCS

Over the past few years, several cases have been decided by the federal
courts involving discrimination claims brought against TNCs pursuant to the
ADA. The plaintiffs in these cases have mobility disabilities and generally
claim that the defendant TNC “pervasively and systematically”10 excluded
them from its ride-share services by failing to make available wheelchair
accessible vehicles. However, these plaintiffs have never actually been
7. Press Release, Peiffer Wolf, Uber to pay $1.1 Million in record award to blind
rideshare passenger (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.peifferwolf.com/uber-to-pay-1-1million-in-record-award-to-blind-rideshare-passenger/. See also Sean Hollister, Uber
will pay a blind woman $1.1 million after drivers stranded her 14 times, THE VERGE
(Apr 3, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/3/22365859/uber-blind-woman-winarbitration-lisa-irving-guide-dog; Joseph Wilkinson, Uber to pay $1.1 million for
drivers’ discrimination against blind woman, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr 2, 2021),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ny-uber-blind-woman-settlement-million20210403-i47vr6cqqnberflnqrbe5llonm-story.html.
8. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 451-52 (2010).
9. Cases that involve standing to bring ADA claims against TNC but do not engage
with arbitration issues are not discussed in this Essay. See, e.g., Crawford v. Uber Tech.,
Inc., 2018 WL 1116725 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Equal Rts. Ctr., 2021 WL 981011.
10. Lowell v. Lyft, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 248, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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passengers of the defendant TNCs. They have not downloaded the relevant
TNC’s mobile application or agreed to its terms of service. As a result, the
defendant TNCs have commonly argued that these plaintiffs do not have
standing to bring their claims under the ADA. Alternatively, if the plaintiffs
are found to have standing, TNCs have argued that the courts should enforce
the arbitration clause contained in their service agreement, which the
plaintiffs would have to––but did not in fact––agree to in order to use the
TNC’s services on the basis of equitable estoppel. I examine each of these
arguments in turn.
A.

Standing

In order to have standing under the ADA, courts have generally required
that a plaintiff show, among other things, an “injury in fact.”11 At the same
time, courts must take a “broad view” of standing because “complaints by
private persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the
Act.”12 Therefore, to demonstrate the required injury in a claim under the
ADA, an individual with a disability is not required to “engage in a futile
gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization covered
by this subchapter does not intend to comply with its provisions.”13 Courts
have held that “actual notice”––also referred to as “actual knowledge”––
generally requires the plaintiff to personally experience the alleged
accessibility issue14 but can also be satisfied by showing that the plaintiff
was deterred from using a service because of alleged ADA noncompliance.15
This requirement of “actual notice” or “actual knowledge” by the plaintiff
in order to show an injury is at the heart of TNCs’ argument that plaintiff
potential passengers have no standing to bring their claims under the ADA.
These plaintiffs, the TNCs argue, did not in fact use or attempt to use the
ride-share services they complain of. Therefore, they cannot show “actual
knowledge” in order to establish an injury for the purpose of standing to
bring a claim under the ADA. The federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit,16 a federal District Court in New York,17 and a federal District Court

11. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
12. Fiedler v. Ocean Prop., Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D. Me. 2010) (quoting

Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L. Ed. 2d 415
(1972)).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Perdum v. Forest City Ratner Cos., 174 F. Supp. 3d 706, 715 (E.D.N.Y.
2016).
15. See, e.g., C.R. Educ. and Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Prop. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th
Cir. 2017).
16. Namisnak v. Uber Tech., Inc., 971 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2020).
17. Lowell v. Lyft, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 248 (S.D. N.Y. 2018).
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in Pennsylvania,18 have all rejected this argument. In the context of access to
transportation through a digital application, these courts have found that the
plaintiff potential passengers were deterred from using the defendant TNCs’
mobile application and should not be required to engage in the “futile
gesture” of downloading the application, request a ride, and be refused. The
courts have further found that the plaintiffs already had plausible “actual
knowledge” that the relevant TNC did not offer sufficient accessible
transportation for those with mobility disabilities. Therefore, the plaintiffs in
these cases were found to have standing to bring claims under the ADA
against TNCs.
In contrast, the federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
decided a similar case differently.19 The plaintiff had not downloaded Uber’s
mobile application. Rather, she concluded from secondhand accounts and a
screenshot of the application that, although Uber did use wheelchair
accessible vehicles where the plaintiff lived, she could not rely on the service
for regular and efficient use. The Court found that the plaintiff did not have
standing to bring a discrimination claim under the ADA since her complaint
lacked any allegation of an “individualized” or ”personalized” experience
with Uber.20 Moreover, the Court found that it was “too attenuated to
conclude that the mere act of downloading Uber’s app and opening an
account—without more—would subject her to harm from discrimination.”21
Interestingly, the Court noted that the reason the plaintiff had not downloaded
Uber’s mobile application and gained this personalized experience with the
use of its services likely came from a concern that, had she downloaded the
application, ordered the wheelchair accessible vehicle, and then sought to
bring the lawsuit, Uber “would seek to compel arbitration, as reportedly
required by its customer service agreement.”22Ineed, as I will discuss in the
next Part, this is commonly the case with plaintiff passengers who have actually
.used the TNC’s ride-share services

18. O’Hanlon v. Uber Tech., Inc., 2019 WL 5895425 (W.D. Penn. 2019). The
decision of the district court with regard to the applicability of the arbitration clause to
the plaintiffs, discussed below, has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. The Third Circuit found that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district
court’s finding on standing. O’Hanlon v. Uber Tech., Inc., 2021 WL 1011201 (3rd Cir.
2021).
19. Access Living of Metropolitan Chicago v. Uber Tech., 958 F.3d 604 (7th Cir.
2020).
20. Id. at 614.
21. Id. at 615.
22. Id. at 614.
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Equitable Estoppel

As noted above, the defendant TNCs have put forward an alternative
argument in these cases once standing was established, which is rooted in
arbitration rather than the ADA. They argued that the plaintiff potential
passengers were bound by the arbitration clause in the TNCs’ service
agreement, despite not having signed it. According to the TNCs, plaintiffs
should be equitably estopped from denying the application of this arbitration
clause either on the basis of “direct benefits” or “intertwined claims.”
Equitable estoppel on the basis of “direct benefits” may be used to compel
a non-signatory to arbitrate where the non-signatory has benefited directly23
from the contract or indirectly by “exploit[ing] the contractual relation of
parties to an agreement” without assuming the contract itself.24 Equitable
estoppel on the basis of “intertwined claims” may be used to compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate where the non-signatory has put forward claims that
are “dependent upon or inextricably intertwined with the obligations
imposed by the contract containing the arbitration clause,”25 for instance
when it relies on the terms of that contract in asserting its claims. Under both
“direct benefits” and “intertwined claims,” a non-signatory is estopped from
denying the applicability of an arbitration clause since it has in some way
“embraced the contract despite [its] nonsignatory status but then, during
litigation, attempt[s] to repudiate the arbitration clause in the contract.”26
Similar to the defendant TNCs’ standing argument, these equitable
estoppel arguments have also been rejected in the cases discussed above. The
plaintiff potential passenger, the District Court in New York found, had not
received any benefit from the defendant TNC’s service agreement. Indeed,
the fact that she could not receive the benefit of the TNC’s ride-share services
was the reason for her discrimination action.27 The District Court in
Pennsylvania has also rejected the defendant TNC’s assertions that the
plaintiffs had “embraced” its service agreement by making claims under the
ADA, or that they “stand in the shoes” of passengers who have accepted the
TNCs’ terms of the service, including the arbitration clause.28 The Ninth
23. Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 770 F.3d 349, 353 (9th Cir.
1999).
24. Boroditskiy v. European Specialties LLC, 314 F. Supp. 3d 487, 495 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
25. JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429, 445 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011).
26. Ouadani v. TF Final Mile LLC, 876 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2017).
27. Lowell, 352 F.Supp. 3d at 260 (“[i]t seems supremely unjust to hold individuals
to an arbitration clause buried in the verbiage of a terms of service of agreement for a
service that they did not sign up for, particularly when those individuals have not
received any benefits from the agreement, direct or indirect.”).
28. O’Hanlon, 2019 WL 5895425, at *6.
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Circuit has similarly rejected the defendant TNC’s argument that equitable
estoppel should be applied on the basis of “intertwined claims.” The Court
found that the plaintiff potential passengers did not allege any claim that was
founded in or even tangentially related to a “violation of any duty, obligation,
term or condition” imposed by the TNC service agreement. 29 Rather, the
Court held, plaintiffs’ claims arose from the ADA alone. Since the TNCs’
equitable estoppel arguments in these cases have all been rejected, the
plaintiffs’ discrimination claims have proceeded to be determined by the
courts rather than in arbitration.
These decisions contribute to the growing body of jurisprudence
concerning the use of arbitration by TNCs in standard-form contracts,30 and
shed light on the implications of such use in discrimination cases. They are
particularly helpful in elucidating the circumstances in which it may be
justified to apply equitable estoppel in cases involving non-signatories to
arbitration agreements.31 Since arbitration is founded on the principle of
consent,32 it generally cannot be forced by or against a party who did not
agree to it. Nonetheless, applying equitable estoppel to compel arbitration
may be justified, for instance, where the non-signatory has benefited from
the contract. The rationale is that a non-signatory should be estopped from
relying on its lack of signature to preclude the enforcement of an arbitration
clause when it has asserted that other beneficial provisions of the same
contract do apply to it.33 Applying equitable estoppel to compel arbitration
by or against a non-signatory may also be justified where the issues to be
resolved in the dispute are intertwined with the contract containing the
arbitration clause. The rationale is that a party “cannot have it both ways. (It)
cannot rely on the contract when it works to its advantage, and repudiate it
when it works to (its) disadvantage.”34
29. Namisnak, 971 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Goldman v. KPMG, LLP, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d
534, 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)).
30. See, e.g., Jill I. Gross, The Uberization of Arbitration Clauses, 9 ARB. L. REV.
43 (2017); Tamar Meshel, Mobile-Based Transportation Employment Disputes:
Corporate Chutzpa and the Potential Resurrection of Class Arbitration, CHICAGO L.
REV. ONLINE (June 5, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/06/05/corporatechutzpa-meshel/.
31. See generally, e.g., Tamar Meshel, Of International Commercial Arbitration,
Non-signatories, and American Federalism: The Case for a Federal Equitable Estoppel
Rule, 56 STAN. J. INT’L L. 123 (2020).
32. GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA,
LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1648 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
33. Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411,
418 (4th Cir. 2000).
34. Hughes Masonry Co., Inc. v. Greater Clark Cty. Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836,
839 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co., 259 F. Supp. 688,
692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
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In other circumstances, however, equitable estoppel may be an improper
basis for compelling arbitration by or against a non-signatory. For instance,
where the non-signatory has neither benefited from the contract containing
the arbitration clause nor is advancing claims in reliance on that contract.
Indeed, a good example is provided in the cases discussed above, involving
ADA claims brought against TNCs by potential passengers. Refusing to
compel arbitration in such situations would not “disregard equity” or
“contravene the purposes” of the FAA, in contrast to situations where
enforcement of an arbitration clause on the grounds of equitable estoppel is
truly called for.35 Rather, applying a measured approach to equitable estoppel
in non-signatory arbitration cases and resorting to it only in appropriate cases
would reinforce the doctrine and ensure that it is applied in line with the
“FAA’s inherent consent restriction.”36
II.

IRVING V. UBER: ARBITRATION IN THE CONSUMER CONTEXT

In 2018, Ms. Lisa Irving––a legally blind passenger––commenced an
arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) against Uber.
Ms. Irving claimed that Uber had violated the ADA as a result of its drivers’
repeated refusal to provide her appropriate transportation or harassment on
the grounds of her blindness and/or seeing eye dog.37 The central bone of
contention between the parties was the status of Uber’s drivers as employees
or independent contractors, which both viewed as determinative of Uber’s
liability.
However, the arbitrator found that this distinction between employees and
independent contractors “is not primarily decisive because of overriding
federal policy regarding ADA compliance.”38 After conducting an
evidentiary hearings and receiving detailed post-hearing opening and reply
briefs from the parties, the arbitrator ruled that Uber is liable for the incidents
complained of under “independent federal grounds” as well as “due to
Uber’s contractual supervision over its drivers and for its failure to prevent
discrimination by properly training its workers.”39 In reaching these
conclusions, the arbitrator examined the interpretation of the ADA in the
case law as well as by the Department of Justice and the Department of
35. Int’l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 418 (quoting Avila Grp., Inc. v. Norma J. of
California, 426 F. Supp. 537, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
36. GE Energy Power Conversion, 140 S.Ct. 1637, 1649 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
37. References in this Part to the factual background of the case, the procedural
history of the arbitration, the arbitrator’s findings, and the outcome of the arbitration are
based on the March 2021 merits arbitration award. Lisa Irving v. Uber Technologies,
Inc., AAA Case No. 01-18-0002-7614 (2021) [hereinafter Merits Arbitration Award].
38. Merits Arbitration Award, at 3.
39. Id. at 3-4.
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Transportation. The arbitrator noted the non-delegable nature of duties
arising under the ADA and found that these duties applied directly to Uber
and by extension to its drivers. This conclusion, the arbitrator found, was
further corroborated by––although not dependent upon––his finding that the
drivers had an “employment relationship” with Uber given Uber’s control
over them.40 Examining Uber’s conduct, the arbitrator further found that
Uber was aware of the discriminatory conduct of some of its drivers but
failed to properly investigate, discipline, or train them.
Noting that “Uber has not provided facts or arguments based in law to
refute the discrimination by its drivers[,]”41 the arbitrator proceeded to award
Ms. Irving damages for 14 instances in which she had been discriminated
against by Uber’s drivers, some in amounts higher than the statutory
minimum under California law.42 These instances included several incidents
in which Ms. Irving was denied rides and was “stranded by the Uber drivers”
or suffered discriminatory remarks made directly at her while she was in the
vehicle.43 The arbitrator also awarded Ms. Irving damages for the
“significant emotional distress” she had suffered after face-to-face
interactions with drivers on several occasions, noting that she was
“humiliated,” late for work, and left in a dark and dangerous area at a late
hour.44 The arbitrator further awarded Ms. Irving damages for the “additional
emotional distress and significant inconvenience” she had suffered from
several occasions in which she was denied rides by drivers who “brought her
to tears” and left her in the rain.45 Finally, the arbitrator awarded Ms. Irving
damages for incidents that involved “verbally abusive drivers,” with respect
to which he found that
40. Id. at 7. While this finding was not the basis for the arbitrator’s decision, it is
noteworthy given the multi-jurisdictional battle that TNCs have been fighting against the
classification of their drivers as employees, referred to above. The status of drivers as
employees or independent contractors is one of the main substantive issues that TNCs
have been attempting to refer to arbitration pursuant to the FAA rather than resolve in
the courts. However, whether this issue is to be resolved in arbitration does not depend
on TNC drivers being employees or independent contractors. Rather, the application of
the FAA to TNC drivers depends on whether they are “transportation workers” who are
“engaged in interstate commerce” within the meaning of § 1 of the FAA and therefore
exempt from the FAA. In this regard, see, e.g., Tamar Meshel, If Apps Be the Food of
the Future, Arbitrate On!: Mobile-Based Ride-Sharing, Transportation Workers, and
Interstate Commerce, 15 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1 (2020). A Writ for Certiorari is currently
pending before the Supreme Court on this question. See Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
966 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020).
41. Merits Arbitration Award, at 15.
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a). The minimum amount is $4,000 per incident.
43. Merits Arbitration Award, at 16.
44. Id. at 16-17.
45. Id. at 17-18.
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Ms. Irving feared for her safety . . . [The driver] yelled at her to get out of
his car at least fifteen times, at one point pulling over to demand she get out
in a dangerous area, making her feel helpless by his intimidation and threats.
[The driver] grabbed Ms. Irving’s phone and refused to return it, and then
filed a police report against her. Ms. Irving was physically upset during the
hearing while testifying about this incident.46
Throughout his findings on damages, the arbitrator referenced case law
and damages awards granted in similar cases. The total amount awarded to
Ms. Irving in damages was $324,000, plus approximately $800,000 to cover
her legal costs.47
While this arbitration is admittedly anecdotal,48 it contributes to refuting
some common criticisms of consumer arbitration in the TNC context and
more broadly. First, the significance of the decision is not so much in the
amount of damages awarded to Ms. Irving, but rather in the simple fact that
the consumer––not the corporate “repeat-player”––prevailed.49 This case
therefore illustrates that, to the extent that TNCs and other corporate parties
perceive mandatory arbitration in a standard form consumer contract as a
method by which they could evade liability,50 this perception does not
necessarily reflect the reality of consumer arbitration. Moreover, while
consumer arbitration has been criticized for being confidential and taking
place behind closed doors,51 research has found that arbitrators, as in the
Irving v. Uber case, tend to give detailed reasons, engage in substantial legal
analysis, and make extensive use of precedent, mostly of published judicial

46. Id. at 21.
47. Id. at 22.
48. I conducted a search of AAA Consumer Arbitration Awards but did not find any

other award involving a TNC and the ADA. It is not my intention to draw general
conclusions from this single example. My goal is merely to use this case as an illustration
that arbitration is not necessarily disadvantageous to consumers in this context.
49. The so-called “repeat player effect” is the alleged tendency of arbitrators to favor
corporate parties that are more likely to repeatedly use arbitration. See, e.g., Lisa B.
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 189, 190-91 (1997).
50. See, e.g., Shauhin A. Talesh & Peter C. Alter, The Devil is in the Details: How
Arbitration System Design and Training Facilitate and Inhibit Repeat-player
Advantages in Private and State-run Arbitration Hearings, 42(4) LAW & POL’Y 315, 317
(2020) (finding that “managerial values influence the arbitration process and provide a
pathway for subtle repeat-player advantages in actual hearings.”).
51. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L.
REV. 679, 681 (2018) (“To the extent that firms do impose obligations on their employees
(and customers) to arbitrate rather than litigate future legal disputes, they can often draw
a heavy veil of secrecy around allegations of misconduct and their resolution.”); Erik
Encarnacion, Discrimination, Mandatory Arbitration, and Courts, 108 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 855, 861 (2020) (“[F]ully protecting rights against discrimination requires making
authoritative and public institutions available to protect them . . . “).
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opinions.52 Finally, the alternative avenue that Ms. Irving would have to
pursue had Uber’s service agreement not contained an arbitration clause
must be considered. This alternative avenue would be court litigation, which
would likely be longer and more expensive.53
The Irving v. Uber arbitration is merely one real-world example, but it
serves as a reminder of what passengers could gain from arbitration against
TNCs, if done right.54 This is not to suggest that arbitration is a panacea for
all disputes in all sectors and in all circumstances. There may well be
situations where the arbitral process is abused by the parties, the arbitral
institution, or the arbitrator.55 But as against such “parades of horribles,”56
the Irving v. Uber arbitration demonstrates what empirical studies57 have
long shown––that not all mandatory consumer arbitrations are necessarily
“unfair.”58
III.

CONCLUSION

Courts retain a gatekeeping function in the context of arbitration and
ultimately determine whether an arbitration agreement, even one that is
“mandatory,” should be enforced. The intersection of ADA discrimination
claims and arbitration in the TNC context is no different. Federal courts have
consistently found that the non-signatory status of plaintiff potential
passengers with respect to TNCs’ service agreements does not negate their
52. W. C. Mark Weidenmaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create
Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2012).
53. Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act
and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 470.
54. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a
Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective
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standing to bring claims under the ADA, but does negate the imposition of
the arbitration clause contained in these service agreements on them. While
arbitration agreements are enforceable as any other contract, including on
such grounds as equitable estoppel, arbitration is fundamentally rooted in
consent. It should therefore be compelled by or against non-signatories only
where it is just and appropriate to do so. The courts’ consistent refusal to
compel plaintiff potential passengers to submit their claims against TNCs to
arbitration therefore reinforces it as a valid and legitimate dispute resolution
mechanism in this context.
Where TNCs’ service terms are accepted by passengers and arbitration is
enforced as a result, this should not be viewed as a necessarily unfair or anticonsumer practice. As the Irving v. Uber case demonstrates, albeit
anecdotally, arbitration can produce as “fair” an outcome, from the
consumer’s perspective, as a court can. There may well be situations where
other dispute resolution mechanisms, such as litigation or mediation, will
prove more suitable or better reflect the parties’ intentions. Determinations
of which mechanism is most appropriate should be made on the basis of the
parties’ relationship, their undertakings and overall interests, and how each
process is designed in context.59 As the recent experience of ADA claims
against TNCs––brought both before courts and arbitrators––illustrates, what
ought to be avoided is a wholesale indictment of arbitration as an inadequate
mechanism as a matter of principle in the TNC context.

59. See Jill I. Gross, Arbitration Archetypes for Enhancing Access to Justice, 68
Fordham L. Rev. 2319, 2324 (2020) (proposing a framework to assess “whether a
particular form of arbitration enhances disputants’ access to justice relative to
litigation.”).

